diff options
| author | Jeff Darcy <jdarcy@redhat.com> | 2014-10-21 16:54:48 -0400 | 
|---|---|---|
| committer | Vijay Bellur <vbellur@redhat.com> | 2014-10-29 04:37:55 -0700 | 
| commit | ab017cabfb547f423fd0d9702865edcb91b58c53 (patch) | |
| tree | d8e063c07f18e4692599291a66f75914fd7c28f4 | |
| parent | 190f43f1818e097a4e4f041c4f56516b067632f0 (diff) | |
socket: disallow CBC cipher modes
This is related to CVE-2014-3566 a.k.a. POODLE.
	http://web.nvd.nist.gov/view/vuln/detail?vulnId=CVE-2014-3566
POODLE is specific to CBC cipher modes in SSLv3.  Because there is no
way to prevent SSLv3 fallback on a system with an unpatched version of
OpenSSL, users of such systems can only be protected by disallowing CBC
modes.  The default cipher-mode specification in our code has been
changed accordingly.  Users can still set their own cipher modes if they
wish.  To support them, the ssl-authz.t test script provides an example
of how to combine the CBC exclusion with other criteria in a script.
Change-Id: Ib1fa547082fbb7de9df94ffd182b1800d6e354e5
BUG: 1157659
Signed-off-by: Jeff Darcy <jdarcy@redhat.com>
Reviewed-on: http://review.gluster.org/8962
Tested-by: Gluster Build System <jenkins@build.gluster.com>
Reviewed-by: Kaleb KEITHLEY <kkeithle@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Vijay Bellur <vbellur@redhat.com>
Reviewed-on: http://review.gluster.org/8987
Reviewed-by: Niels de Vos <ndevos@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Niels de Vos <ndevos@redhat.com>
| -rw-r--r-- | rpc/rpc-transport/socket/src/socket.c | 68 | ||||
| -rwxr-xr-x | tests/features/ssl-authz.t | 17 | 
2 files changed, 84 insertions, 1 deletions
diff --git a/rpc/rpc-transport/socket/src/socket.c b/rpc/rpc-transport/socket/src/socket.c index b9554cc0ed4..0917e0b2ecc 100644 --- a/rpc/rpc-transport/socket/src/socket.c +++ b/rpc/rpc-transport/socket/src/socket.c @@ -45,6 +45,72 @@  #define SSL_CA_LIST_OPT     "transport.socket.ssl-ca-list"  #define OWN_THREAD_OPT      "transport.socket.own-thread" +/* + * This list was derived by taking the cipher list "HIGH:!SSLv2" (the previous + * default) and excluding CBC entries to mitigate the "POODLE" attack.  It + * should be re-evaluated in light of each future vulnerability, as those are + * discovered. + */ +static char *default_cipher_list = +        "ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384:" +        "ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384:" +        "ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA384:" +        "ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-SHA384:" +        "ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA:" +        "ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-SHA:" +        "DHE-DSS-AES256-GCM-SHA384:" +        "DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384:" +        "DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA256:" +        "DHE-DSS-AES256-SHA256:" +        "DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA:" +        "DHE-DSS-AES256-SHA:" +        "DHE-RSA-CAMELLIA256-SHA:" +        "DHE-DSS-CAMELLIA256-SHA:" +        "AECDH-AES256-SHA:" +        "ADH-AES256-GCM-SHA384:" +        "ADH-AES256-SHA256:" +        "ADH-AES256-SHA:" +        "ADH-CAMELLIA256-SHA:" +        "ECDH-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384:" +        "ECDH-ECDSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384:" +        "ECDH-RSA-AES256-SHA384:" +        "ECDH-ECDSA-AES256-SHA384:" +        "ECDH-RSA-AES256-SHA:" +        "ECDH-ECDSA-AES256-SHA:" +        "AES256-GCM-SHA384:" +        "AES256-SHA256:" +        "AES256-SHA:" +        "CAMELLIA256-SHA:" +        "ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256:" +        "ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256:" +        "ECDHE-RSA-AES128-SHA256:" +        "ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-SHA256:" +        "ECDHE-RSA-AES128-SHA:" +        "ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-SHA:" +        "DHE-DSS-AES128-GCM-SHA256:" +        "DHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256:" +        "DHE-RSA-AES128-SHA256:" +        "DHE-DSS-AES128-SHA256:" +        "DHE-RSA-AES128-SHA:" +        "DHE-DSS-AES128-SHA:" +        "DHE-RSA-CAMELLIA128-SHA:" +        "DHE-DSS-CAMELLIA128-SHA:" +        "AECDH-AES128-SHA:" +        "ADH-AES128-GCM-SHA256:" +        "ADH-AES128-SHA256:" +        "ADH-AES128-SHA:" +        "ADH-CAMELLIA128-SHA:" +        "ECDH-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256:" +        "ECDH-ECDSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256:" +        "ECDH-RSA-AES128-SHA256:" +        "ECDH-ECDSA-AES128-SHA256:" +        "ECDH-RSA-AES128-SHA:" +        "ECDH-ECDSA-AES128-SHA:" +        "AES128-GCM-SHA256:" +        "AES128-SHA256:" +        "AES128-SHA:" +        "CAMELLIA128-SHA";      /* no colon for last entry */ +  /* TBD: do automake substitutions etc. (ick) to set these. */  #if !defined(DEFAULT_ETC_SSL)  #  ifdef GF_LINUX_HOST_OS @@ -3552,7 +3618,7 @@ socket_init (rpc_transport_t *this)          uint32_t          backlog = 0;  	int               session_id = 0;          int32_t           cert_depth = 1; -        char             *cipher_list = "HIGH:-SSLv2"; +        char             *cipher_list = default_cipher_list;          int               ret;          if (this->private) { diff --git a/tests/features/ssl-authz.t b/tests/features/ssl-authz.t index e4ea268b53b..37cbbd789c0 100755 --- a/tests/features/ssl-authz.t +++ b/tests/features/ssl-authz.t @@ -26,6 +26,22 @@ TEST glusterd  TEST pidof glusterd  TEST $CLI volume info; +# Construct a cipher list that excludes CBC because of POODLE. +# http://web.nvd.nist.gov/view/vuln/detail?vulnId=CVE-2014-3566 +# +# Since this is a bit opaque, here's what it does: +#	(1) Get the ciphers matching a normal cipher-list spec +#	(2) Delete any colon-separated entries containing "CBC" +#	(3) Collapse adjacent colons from deleted entries +#	(4) Remove colons at the beginning or end +function valid_ciphers { +	openssl ciphers 'HIGH:!SSLv2' | sed	\ +		-e '/[^:]*CBC[^:]*/s///g'	\ +		-e '/::*/s//:/g'		\ +		-e '/^:/s///'			\ +		-e '/:$/s///' +} +  TEST openssl genrsa -out $SSL_KEY 1024  TEST openssl req -new -x509 -key $SSL_KEY -subj /CN=Anyone -out $SSL_CERT  ln $SSL_CERT $SSL_CA @@ -33,6 +49,7 @@ ln $SSL_CERT $SSL_CA  TEST $CLI volume create $V0 $H0:$B0/1  TEST $CLI volume set $V0 server.ssl on  TEST $CLI volume set $V0 client.ssl on +#EST $CLI volume set $V0 ssl.cipher-list $(valid_ciphers)  TEST $CLI volume set $V0 auth.ssl-allow Anyone  TEST $CLI volume start $V0  | 
