diff options
| -rw-r--r-- | configure.ac | 2 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | rpc/rpc-transport/socket/src/socket.c | 111 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | rpc/rpc-transport/socket/src/socket.h | 2 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | tests/features/ssl-ciphers.t | 13 | 
4 files changed, 107 insertions, 21 deletions
diff --git a/configure.ac b/configure.ac index a4cec90afbf..89e330aaada 100644 --- a/configure.ac +++ b/configure.ac @@ -489,6 +489,8 @@ AC_CHECK_HEADERS([openssl/dh.h])  AC_CHECK_HEADERS([openssl/ecdh.h]) +AC_CHECK_LIB([ssl], [SSL_CTX_get0_param], [AC_DEFINE([HAVE_SSL_CTX_GET0_PARAM], [1], [define if found OpenSSL SSL_CTX_get0_param])]) +  dnl Math library  AC_CHECK_LIB([m], [pow], [MATH_LIB='-lm'], [MATH_LIB=''])  AC_SUBST(MATH_LIB) diff --git a/rpc/rpc-transport/socket/src/socket.c b/rpc/rpc-transport/socket/src/socket.c index 26dbe0b706a..ecd27e039fb 100644 --- a/rpc/rpc-transport/socket/src/socket.c +++ b/rpc/rpc-transport/socket/src/socket.c @@ -308,8 +308,65 @@ out:  #define ssl_write_one(t, b, l)                                                 \      ssl_do((t), (b), (l), (SSL_trinary_func *)SSL_write) +/* set crl verify flags only for server */ +/* see man X509_VERIFY_PARAM_SET_FLAGS(3) + * X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK enables CRL checking for the certificate chain + * leaf certificate. An error occurs if a suitable CRL cannot be found. + * Since we're never going to revoke a gluster node cert, we better disable + * CRL check for server certs to avoid getting error and failed connection + * attempts. + */ +static void +ssl_clear_crl_verify_flags(SSL_CTX *ssl_ctx) +{ +#ifdef X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK_ALL +#ifdef HAVE_SSL_CTX_GET0_PARAM +    X509_VERIFY_PARAM *vpm; + +    vpm = SSL_CTX_get0_param(ssl_ctx); +    if (vpm) { +        X509_VERIFY_PARAM_clear_flags( +            vpm, (X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK | X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK_ALL)); +    } +#else +    /* CRL verify flag need not be cleared for rhel6 kind of clients */ +#endif +#else +    gf_log(this->name, GF_LOG_ERROR, "OpenSSL version does not support CRL"); +#endif +    return; +} + +/* set crl verify flags only for server */ +static void +ssl_set_crl_verify_flags(SSL_CTX *ssl_ctx) +{ +#ifdef X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK_ALL +#ifdef HAVE_SSL_CTX_GET0_PARAM +    X509_VERIFY_PARAM *vpm; + +    vpm = SSL_CTX_get0_param(ssl_ctx); +    if (vpm) { +        unsigned long flags; + +        flags = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get_flags(vpm); +        flags |= (X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK | X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK_ALL); +        X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags(vpm, flags); +    } +#else +    X509_STORE *x509store; + +    x509store = SSL_CTX_get_cert_store(ssl_ctx); +    X509_STORE_set_flags(x509store, +                         X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK | X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK_ALL); +#endif +#else +    gf_log(this->name, GF_LOG_ERROR, "OpenSSL version does not support CRL"); +#endif +} +  int -ssl_setup_connection_prefix(rpc_transport_t *this) +ssl_setup_connection_prefix(rpc_transport_t *this, gf_boolean_t server)  {      int ret = -1;      socket_private_t *priv = NULL; @@ -332,6 +389,9 @@ ssl_setup_connection_prefix(rpc_transport_t *this)      priv->ssl_accepted = _gf_false;      priv->ssl_context_created = _gf_false; +    if (!server && priv->crl_path) +        ssl_clear_crl_verify_flags(priv->ssl_ctx); +      priv->ssl_ssl = SSL_new(priv->ssl_ctx);      if (!priv->ssl_ssl) {          gf_log(this->name, GF_LOG_ERROR, "SSL_new failed"); @@ -2681,7 +2741,7 @@ ssl_handle_server_connection_attempt(rpc_transport_t *this)      fd = priv->sock;      if (!priv->ssl_context_created) { -        ret = ssl_setup_connection_prefix(this); +        ret = ssl_setup_connection_prefix(this, _gf_true);          if (ret < 0) {              gf_log(this->name, GF_LOG_TRACE,                     "> ssl_setup_connection_prefix() failed!"); @@ -2735,7 +2795,7 @@ ssl_handle_client_connection_attempt(rpc_transport_t *this)          ret = -1;      } else {          if (!priv->ssl_context_created) { -            ret = ssl_setup_connection_prefix(this); +            ret = ssl_setup_connection_prefix(this, _gf_false);              if (ret < 0) {                  gf_log(this->name, GF_LOG_TRACE,                         "> ssl_setup_connection_prefix() " @@ -3102,7 +3162,30 @@ socket_server_event_handler(int fd, int idx, int gen, void *data, int poll_in,          gf_log(this->name, GF_LOG_TRACE, "XXX server:%s, client:%s",                 new_trans->myinfo.identifier, new_trans->peerinfo.identifier); +        /* Make options available to local socket_init() to create new +         * SSL_CTX per transport. A separate SSL_CTX per transport is +         * required to avoid setting crl checking options for client +         * connections. The verification options eventually get copied +         * to the SSL object. Unfortunately, there's no way to identify +         * whether socket_init() is being called after a client-side +         * connect() or a server-side accept(). Although, we could pass +         * a flag from the transport init() to the socket_init() and +         * from this place, this doesn't identify the case where the +         * server-side transport loading is done for the first time. +         * Also, SSL doesn't apply for UNIX sockets. +         */ +        if (new_sockaddr.ss_family != AF_UNIX) +            new_trans->options = dict_ref(this->options); +        new_trans->ctx = this->ctx; +          ret = socket_init(new_trans); + +        /* reset options to NULL to avoid double free */ +        if (new_sockaddr.ss_family != AF_UNIX) { +            dict_unref(new_trans->options); +            new_trans->options = NULL; +        } +          if (ret != 0) {              gf_log(this->name, GF_LOG_WARNING,                     "initialization of new_trans " @@ -4167,7 +4250,6 @@ ssl_setup_connection_params(rpc_transport_t *this)      char *cipher_list = DEFAULT_CIPHER_LIST;      char *dh_param = DEFAULT_DH_PARAM;      char *ec_curve = DEFAULT_EC_CURVE; -    char *crl_path = NULL;      priv = this->private; @@ -4209,6 +4291,7 @@ ssl_setup_connection_params(rpc_transport_t *this)      }      priv->ssl_ca_list = gf_strdup(priv->ssl_ca_list); +    optstr = NULL;      if (dict_get_str(this->options, SSL_CRL_PATH_OPT, &optstr) == 0) {          if (!priv->ssl_enabled) {              gf_log(this->name, GF_LOG_WARNING, @@ -4216,9 +4299,9 @@ ssl_setup_connection_params(rpc_transport_t *this)                     SSL_ENABLED_OPT);          }          if (strcasecmp(optstr, "NULL") == 0) -            crl_path = NULL; +            priv->crl_path = NULL;          else -            crl_path = optstr; +            priv->crl_path = gf_strdup(optstr);      }      gf_log(this->name, priv->ssl_enabled ? GF_LOG_INFO : GF_LOG_DEBUG, @@ -4360,25 +4443,15 @@ ssl_setup_connection_params(rpc_transport_t *this)          }          if (!SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations(priv->ssl_ctx, priv->ssl_ca_list, -                                           crl_path)) { +                                           priv->crl_path)) {              gf_log(this->name, GF_LOG_ERROR, "could not load CA list");              goto err;          }          SSL_CTX_set_verify_depth(priv->ssl_ctx, cert_depth); -        if (crl_path) { -#ifdef X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK_ALL -            X509_STORE *x509store; - -            x509store = SSL_CTX_get_cert_store(priv->ssl_ctx); -            X509_STORE_set_flags( -                x509store, X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK | X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK_ALL); -#else -            gf_log(this->name, GF_LOG_ERROR, -                   "OpenSSL version does not support CRL"); -#endif -        } +        if (priv->crl_path) +            ssl_set_crl_verify_flags(priv->ssl_ctx);          priv->ssl_session_id = session_id++;          SSL_CTX_set_session_id_context(priv->ssl_ctx, diff --git a/rpc/rpc-transport/socket/src/socket.h b/rpc/rpc-transport/socket/src/socket.h index 32339d362d2..897d98db698 100644 --- a/rpc/rpc-transport/socket/src/socket.h +++ b/rpc/rpc-transport/socket/src/socket.h @@ -14,6 +14,7 @@  #include <openssl/ssl.h>  #include <openssl/err.h>  #include <openssl/x509v3.h> +#include <openssl/x509_vfy.h>  #ifdef HAVE_OPENSSL_DH_H  #include <openssl/dh.h>  #endif @@ -245,6 +246,7 @@ typedef struct {      char *ssl_own_cert;      char *ssl_private_key;      char *ssl_ca_list; +    char *crl_path;      int pipe[2];      struct gf_sock_incoming incoming;      /* -1 = not connected. 0 = in progress. 1 = connected */ diff --git a/tests/features/ssl-ciphers.t b/tests/features/ssl-ciphers.t index 563d37c5277..7e1e1996ac6 100644 --- a/tests/features/ssl-ciphers.t +++ b/tests/features/ssl-ciphers.t @@ -175,8 +175,6 @@ BRICK_PORT=`brick_port $V0`  EXPECT "Y" openssl_connect -cipher EECDH -connect $H0:$BRICK_PORT  # test revocation -# no need to restart the volume since the options are used -# by the client here.  TEST $CLI volume set $V0 ssl.crl-path $TMPDIR  EXPECT $TMPDIR volume_option $V0 ssl.crl-path  $GFS --volfile-id=$V0 --volfile-server=$H0 $M0 @@ -189,14 +187,25 @@ TEST openssl ca -batch -config $SSL_CFG -revoke $SSL_CERT 2>&1  TEST openssl ca -config $SSL_CFG -gencrl -out $SSL_CRL 2>&1  # Failed once revoked +# Although client fails to mount without restarting the server after crl-path +# is set when no actual crl file is found on the client, it would also fail +# when server is restarted for the same reason. Since the socket initialization +# code is the same for client and server, the crl verification flags need to +# be turned off for the client to avoid SSL searching for CRLs in the +# ssl.crl-path. If no CRL files are found in the ssl.crl-path, SSL fails the +# connect() attempt on the client. +TEST $CLI volume stop $V0 +TEST $CLI volume start $V0  $GFS --volfile-id=$V0 --volfile-server=$H0 $M0  EXPECT "N" wait_mount $M0  TEST ! test -f $TEST_FILE  EXPECT_WITHIN $UMOUNT_TIMEOUT "Y" force_umount $M0  # Succeed with CRL disabled +TEST $CLI volume stop $V0  TEST $CLI volume set $V0 ssl.crl-path NULL  EXPECT NULL volume_option $V0 ssl.crl-path +TEST $CLI volume start $V0  $GFS --volfile-id=$V0 --volfile-server=$H0 $M0  EXPECT "Y" wait_mount $M0  TEST test -f $TEST_FILE  | 
