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Change-Id: If385ba0993fdbd3e3b7500b2b6631721911e0ab3
BUG: 1100144
Signed-off-by: Pranith Kumar K <pkarampu@redhat.com>
Reviewed-on: http://review.gluster.org/7858
Tested-by: Gluster Build System <jenkins@build.gluster.com>
Reviewed-by: Vijay Bellur <vbellur@redhat.com>
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Change-Id: I9be8634f8f3b09def21ba977050330aa3f26c230
BUG: 1099858
Signed-off-by: Pranith Kumar K <pkarampu@redhat.com>
Reviewed-on: http://review.gluster.org/7824
Tested-by: Gluster Build System <jenkins@build.gluster.com>
Reviewed-by: Vijay Bellur <vbellur@redhat.com>
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git@forge.gluster.org:~schafdog/glusterfs-core/osx-glusterfs
Working functionality on MacOSX
- GlusterD (management daemon)
- GlusterCLI (management cli)
- GlusterFS FUSE (using OSXFUSE)
- GlusterNFS (without NLM - issues with rpc.statd)
Change-Id: I20193d3f8904388e47344e523b3787dbeab044ac
BUG: 1089172
Signed-off-by: Harshavardhana <harsha@harshavardhana.net>
Signed-off-by: Dennis Schafroth <dennis@schafroth.com>
Tested-by: Harshavardhana <harsha@harshavardhana.net>
Tested-by: Dennis Schafroth <dennis@schafroth.com>
Reviewed-on: http://review.gluster.org/7503
Tested-by: Gluster Build System <jenkins@build.gluster.com>
Reviewed-by: Anand Avati <avati@redhat.com>
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Without these changes crypt.t crashes when compiled with -DDEBUG
Change-Id: I1f7372aa30a09dbe3ae81d1dd598cf36e17fe0b7
BUG: 1030058
Signed-off-by: Pranith Kumar K <pkarampu@redhat.com>
Reviewed-on: http://review.gluster.org/7319
Tested-by: Gluster Build System <jenkins@build.gluster.com>
Reviewed-by: Vijay Bellur <vbellur@redhat.com>
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There has been a misspelled option in the Makefile.am files. The option
is called -avoid-version, and not -avoidversion.
It is not trivial to provide a test-case for this. One way would be to
check generated RPMs with a command like this (output should be empty):
$ rpm -qlp *.rpm | grep -E '/xlator/.+.so.0'
Change-Id: I2a6cc557eada4d098b73af5a254f8c75707543da
BUG: 1078365
Signed-off-by: Niels de Vos <ndevos@redhat.com>
Reviewed-on: http://review.gluster.org/7299
Reviewed-by: Lalatendu Mohanty <lmohanty@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Kaleb KEITHLEY <kkeithle@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Gluster Build System <jenkins@build.gluster.com>
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i.e. we are trying access the memory after freeing it using GF_FREE
Change-Id: I2b22fd421131c618bd0d7c246ebf09f14751ad30
Signed-off-by: Lalatendu Mohanty <lmohanty@redhat.com>
Reviewed-on: http://review.gluster.org/6626
Reviewed-by: Xavier Hernandez <xhernandez@datalab.es>
Tested-by: Gluster Build System <jenkins@build.gluster.com>
Reviewed-by: Vijay Bellur <vbellur@redhat.com>
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At
--------------------------------------------
1423 if (local->vec.iov_base == NULL) {
--------------------------------------------
This condition being true leads to NULL pointer
to be passed into `memcpy` later at
----------------------------------------------------
1432 memcpy((char *)local->vec.iov_base + copied,
----------------------------------------------------
Avoid this by clean exit through a goto statement with
in the conditional.
Change-Id: I2546b7dd634dc251adae8ca39497c4c3ef520f62
BUG: 1030058
Signed-off-by: Harshavardhana <harsha@harshavardhana.net>
Reviewed-on: http://review.gluster.org/6576
Reviewed-by: Shyamsundar Ranganathan <srangana@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Edward Shishkin <edward.shishkin@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Edward Shishkin <edward.shishkin@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Gluster Build System <jenkins@build.gluster.com>
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define loff_t as off_t, is is already long long anyway.
BUG: 764655
Change-Id: I99edda9b804475a8696c2d32ccf8eae152851e21
Signed-off-by: Emmanuel Dreyfus <manu@netbsd.org>
Reviewed-on: http://review.gluster.org/6286
Tested-by: Gluster Build System <jenkins@build.gluster.com>
Reviewed-by: Vijay Bellur <vbellur@redhat.com>
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.. in the systems with non-trusted server
This new functionality can be useful in various cloud technologies.
It is implemented via a special encryption/crypt translator,which
works on the client side and performs encryption and authentication;
1. Class of supported algorithms
The crypt translator can support any atomic symmetric block cipher
algorithms (which require to pad plain/cipher text before performing
encryption/decryption transform (see glossary in atom.c for
definitions). In particular, it can support algorithms with the EOF
issue (which require to pad the end of file by extra-data).
Crypt translator performs translations
user -> (offset, size) -> (aligned-offset, padded-size) ->server
(and backward), and resolves individual FOPs (write(), truncate(),
etc) to read-modify-write sequences.
A volume can contain files encrypted by different algorithms of the
mentioned class. To change some option value just reconfigure the
volume.
Currently only one algorithm is supported: AES_XTS.
Example of algorithms, which can not be supported by the crypt
translator:
1. Asymmetric block cipher algorithms, which inflate data, e.g. RSA;
2. Symmetric block cipher algorithms with inline MACs for data
authentication.
2. Implementation notes.
a) Atomic algorithms
Since any process in a stackable file system manipulates with local
data (which can be obsoleted by local data of another process), any
atomic cipher algorithm without proper support can lead to non-POSIX
behavior. To resolve the "collisions" we introduce locks: before
performing FOP->read(), FOP->write(), etc. the process should first
lock the file.
b) Algorithms with EOF issue
Such algorithms require to pad the end of file with some extra-data.
Without proper support this will result in losing information about
real file size. Keeping a track of real file size is a responsibility
of the crypt translator. A special extended attribute with the name
"trusted.glusterfs.crypt.att.size" is used for this purpose. All files
contained in bricks of encrypted volume do have "padded" sizes.
3. Non-trusted servers and
Metadata authentication
We assume that server, where user's data is stored on is non-trusted.
It means that the server can be subjected to various attacks directed
to reveal user's encrypted personal data. We provide protection
against such attacks.
Every encrypted file has specific private attributes (cipher algorithm
id, atom size, etc), which are packed to a string (so-called "format
string") and stored as a special extended attribute with the name
"trusted.glusterfs.crypt.att.cfmt". We protect the string from
tampering. This protection is mandatory, hardcoded and is always on.
Without such protection various attacks (based on extending the scope
of per-file secret keys) are possible.
Our authentication method has been developed in tight collaboration
with Red Hat security team and is implemented as "metadata loader of
version 1" (see file metadata.c). This method is NIST-compliant and is
based on checking 8-byte per-hardlink MACs created(updated) by
FOP->create(), FOP->link(), FOP->unlink(), FOP->rename() by the
following unique entities:
. file (hardlink) name;
. verified file's object id (gfid).
Every time, before manipulating with a file, we check it's MACs at
FOP->open() time. Some FOPs don't require a file to be opened (e.g.
FOP->truncate()). In such cases the crypt translator opens the file
mandatory.
4. Generating keys
Unique per-file keys are derived by NIST-compliant methods from the
a) parent key;
b) unique verified object-id of the file (gfid);
Per-volume master key, provided by user at mount time is in the root
of this "tree of keys".
Those keys are used to:
1) encrypt/decrypt file data;
2) encrypt/decrypt file metadata;
3) create per-file and per-link MACs for metadata authentication.
5. Instructions
Getting started with crypt translator
Example:
1) Create a volume "myvol" and enable encryption:
# gluster volume create myvol pepelac:/vols/xvol
# gluster volume set myvol encryption on
2) Set location (absolute pathname) of your master key:
# gluster volume set myvol encryption.master-key /home/me/mykey
3) Set other options to override default options, if needed.
Start the volume.
4) On the client side make sure that the file /home/me/mykey exists
and contains proper per-volume master key (that is 256-bit AES
key). This key has to be in hex form, i.e. should be represented
by 64 symbols from the set {'0', ..., '9', 'a', ..., 'f'}.
The key should start at the beginning of the file. All symbols at
offsets >= 64 are ignored.
5) Mount the volume "myvol" on the client side:
# glusterfs --volfile-server=pepelac --volfile-id=myvol /mnt
After successful mount the file which contains master key may be
removed. NOTE: Keeping the master key between mount sessions is in
user's competence.
**********************************************************************
WARNING! Losing the master key will make content of all regular files
inaccessible. Mount with improper master key allows to access content
of directories: file names are not encrypted.
**********************************************************************
6. Options of crypt translator
1) "master-key": specifies location (absolute pathname) of the file
which contains per-volume master key. There is no default location
for master key.
2) "data-key-size": specifies size of per-file key for data encryption
Possible values:
. "256" default value
. "512"
3) "block-size": specifies atom size. Possible values:
. "512"
. "1024"
. "2048"
. "4096" default value;
7. Test cases
Any workload, which involves the following file operations:
->create();
->open();
->readv();
->writev();
->truncate();
->ftruncate();
->link();
->unlink();
->rename();
->readdirp().
8. TODOs:
1) Currently size of IOs issued by crypt translator is restricted
by block_size (4K by default). We can use larger IOs to improve
performance.
Change-Id: I2601fe95c5c4dc5b22308a53d0cbdc071d5e5cee
BUG: 1030058
Signed-off-by: Edward Shishkin <edward@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Anand Avati <avati@redhat.com>
Reviewed-on: http://review.gluster.org/4667
Tested-by: Gluster Build System <jenkins@build.gluster.com>
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