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#!/bin/bash
. $(dirname $0)/../include.rc
. $(dirname $0)/../volume.rc
ping_file () {
echo hello > $1 2> /dev/null
}
for d in /etc/ssl /etc/openssl /usr/local/etc/openssl ; do
if test -d $d ; then
SSL_BASE=$d
break
fi
done
SSL_KEY=$SSL_BASE/glusterfs.key
SSL_CERT=$SSL_BASE/glusterfs.pem
SSL_CA=$SSL_BASE/glusterfs.ca
cleanup;
rm -f $SSL_BASE/glusterfs.*
mkdir -p $B0/1
mkdir -p $M0
TEST glusterd
TEST pidof glusterd
TEST $CLI volume info;
# Construct a cipher list that excludes CBC because of POODLE.
# http://web.nvd.nist.gov/view/vuln/detail?vulnId=CVE-2014-3566
#
# Since this is a bit opaque, here's what it does:
# (1) Get the ciphers matching a normal cipher-list spec
# (2) Delete any colon-separated entries containing "CBC"
# (3) Collapse adjacent colons from deleted entries
# (4) Remove colons at the beginning or end
function valid_ciphers {
openssl ciphers 'HIGH:!SSLv2' | sed \
-e '/[^:]*CBC[^:]*/s///g' \
-e '/::*/s//:/g' \
-e '/^:/s///' \
-e '/:$/s///'
}
TEST openssl genrsa -out $SSL_KEY 1024
TEST openssl req -new -x509 -key $SSL_KEY -subj /CN=Anyone -out $SSL_CERT
ln $SSL_CERT $SSL_CA
TEST $CLI volume create $V0 $H0:$B0/1
TEST $CLI volume set $V0 server.ssl on
TEST $CLI volume set $V0 client.ssl on
TEST $CLI volume set $V0 ssl.cipher-list $(valid_ciphers)
TEST $CLI volume start $V0
EXPECT_WITHIN $CHILD_UP_TIMEOUT "1" online_brick_count
# This mount should SUCCEED because ssl-allow=* by default. This effectively
# disables SSL authorization, though authentication and encryption might still
# be enabled.
TEST glusterfs --volfile-server=$H0 --volfile-id=$V0 $M0
TEST ping_file $M0/before
EXPECT_WITHIN $UMOUNT_TIMEOUT "Y" force_umount $M0
# Set ssl-allow to a wildcard that includes our identity.
TEST $CLI volume stop $V0
TEST $CLI volume set $V0 auth.ssl-allow Any*
TEST $CLI volume start $V0
EXPECT_WITHIN $CHILD_UP_TIMEOUT "1" online_brick_count
# This mount should SUCCEED because we match the wildcard.
TEST glusterfs --volfile-server=$H0 --volfile-id=$V0 $M0
TEST ping_file $M0/before
EXPECT_WITHIN $UMOUNT_TIMEOUT "Y" force_umount $M0
# Set ssl-allow to include the identity we've created.
TEST $CLI volume stop $V0
TEST $CLI volume set $V0 auth.ssl-allow Anyone
TEST $CLI volume start $V0
# This mount should SUCCEED because this specific identity is allowed.
TEST glusterfs --volfile-server=$H0 --volfile-id=$V0 $M0
TEST ping_file $M0/before
EXPECT_WITHIN $UMOUNT_TIMEOUT "Y" force_umount $M0
# Change the authorized user name. Note that servers don't pick up changes
# automagically like clients do, so we have to stop/start ourselves.
TEST $CLI volume stop $V0
TEST $CLI volume set $V0 auth.ssl-allow NotYou
TEST $CLI volume start $V0
# This mount should FAIL because the identity given by our certificate does not
# match the allowed user. In other words, authentication works (they know who
# we are) but authorization doesn't (we're not the right person).
TEST $GFS --volfile-server=$H0 --volfile-id=$V0 $M0
# Looks like /*/bin/glusterfs isn't returning error status correctly (again).
# We may get an unusable mount where ping will fail, or no mount at all,
# where ping will write to the mount point instead of the mounted filesystem.
# In order to avoid spurious failures, create a file by ping and check it
# is absent from the brick.
ping_file $M0/after
TEST test -f $B0/1/before
TEST ! test -f $B0/1/after
cleanup;
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