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-rw-r--r--xlators/protocol/auth/addr/src/Makefile.am6
-rw-r--r--xlators/protocol/auth/addr/src/addr.c470
-rw-r--r--xlators/protocol/auth/login/src/Makefile.am5
-rw-r--r--xlators/protocol/auth/login/src/login.c318
4 files changed, 481 insertions, 318 deletions
diff --git a/xlators/protocol/auth/addr/src/Makefile.am b/xlators/protocol/auth/addr/src/Makefile.am
index 426e7c2fb36..4694d254f12 100644
--- a/xlators/protocol/auth/addr/src/Makefile.am
+++ b/xlators/protocol/auth/addr/src/Makefile.am
@@ -1,14 +1,14 @@
auth_LTLIBRARIES = addr.la
authdir = $(libdir)/glusterfs/$(PACKAGE_VERSION)/auth
-addr_la_LDFLAGS = -module -avoid-version
+addr_la_LDFLAGS = -module $(GF_XLATOR_LDFLAGS)
addr_la_SOURCES = addr.c
addr_la_LIBADD = $(top_builddir)/libglusterfs/src/libglusterfs.la
-AM_CPPFLAGS = $(GF_CPPFLAGS) \
- -I$(top_srcdir)/libglusterfs/src \
+AM_CPPFLAGS = $(GF_CPPFLAGS) -I$(top_srcdir)/libglusterfs/src \
-I$(top_srcdir)/xlators/protocol/server/src \
+ -I$(top_srcdir)/rpc/xdr/src/ -I$(top_builddir)/rpc/xdr/src/ \
-I$(top_srcdir)/rpc/rpc-lib/src/
AM_CFLAGS = -Wall $(GF_CFLAGS)
diff --git a/xlators/protocol/auth/addr/src/addr.c b/xlators/protocol/auth/addr/src/addr.c
index 6965da01b7a..bf12c455d7c 100644
--- a/xlators/protocol/auth/addr/src/addr.c
+++ b/xlators/protocol/auth/addr/src/addr.c
@@ -8,218 +8,334 @@
cases as published by the Free Software Foundation.
*/
-
#include <fnmatch.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <netdb.h>
#include "authenticate.h"
-#include "dict.h"
+#include <glusterfs/dict.h>
#include "rpc-transport.h"
-#define ADDR_DELIMITER " ,"
+#define ENTRY_DELIMITER ","
+#define ADDR_DELIMITER "|"
#define PRIVILEGED_PORT_CEILING 1024
#ifndef AF_INET_SDP
#define AF_INET_SDP 27
#endif
-auth_result_t
-gf_auth (dict_t *input_params, dict_t *config_params)
+/* An option for subdir validation be like below */
+
+/* 1. '*'
+ 2. '192.168.*'
+ 3. '
+ 4. '!10.10.1*' (Today as per the code, if negate is set on one entry, its
+ never reset)
+ 5. '192.168.1.*, 10.1.10.*';168.168.2.* =/dir;* =/another-dir'
+
+*/
+
+int
+compare_addr_and_update(char *option_str, char *peer_addr, char *subvol,
+ char *delimiter, auth_result_t *result,
+ auth_result_t status)
{
- auth_result_t result = AUTH_DONT_CARE;
- int ret = 0;
- char *name = NULL;
- char *searchstr = NULL;
- peer_info_t *peer_info = NULL;
- data_t *peer_info_data = NULL;
- data_t *allow_addr = NULL;
- data_t *reject_addr = NULL;
- char *addr_str = NULL;
- char *tmp = NULL;
- char *addr_cpy = NULL;
- char *service = NULL;
- uint16_t peer_port = 0;
- char is_inet_sdp = 0;
- char negate = 0;
- char match = 0;
- char peer_addr[UNIX_PATH_MAX];
- char *type = NULL;
- gf_boolean_t allow_insecure = _gf_false;
-
- name = data_to_str (dict_get (input_params, "remote-subvolume"));
- if (!name) {
- gf_log ("authenticate/addr", GF_LOG_DEBUG,
- "remote-subvolume not specified");
- goto out;
+ char *addr_str = NULL;
+ char *tmp = NULL;
+ char negate = 0;
+ char match = 0;
+ int length = 0;
+ int ret = 0;
+
+ addr_str = strtok_r(option_str, delimiter, &tmp);
+
+ while (addr_str) {
+ gf_log(subvol, GF_LOG_INFO, "%s = \"%s\", received addr = \"%s\"",
+ (status == AUTH_ACCEPT) ? "allowed" : "rejected", addr_str,
+ peer_addr);
+ if (addr_str[0] == '!') {
+ negate = 1;
+ addr_str++;
}
- ret = gf_asprintf (&searchstr, "auth.addr.%s.allow", name);
- if (-1 == ret) {
- gf_log ("auth/addr", GF_LOG_DEBUG,
- "asprintf failed while setting search string");
+ length = strlen(addr_str);
+ if ((addr_str[0] != '*') && valid_host_name(addr_str, length)) {
+ match = gf_is_same_address(addr_str, peer_addr);
+ if (match) {
+ *result = status;
goto out;
+ }
+ } else {
+ if (strstr(addr_str, "/")) {
+ match = gf_is_ip_in_net(addr_str, peer_addr);
+ if (negate ? !match : match) {
+ *result = status;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ } else {
+ match = fnmatch(addr_str, peer_addr, 0);
+ if (negate ? match : !match) {
+ *result = status;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ }
}
- allow_addr = dict_get (config_params, searchstr);
- GF_FREE (searchstr);
+ addr_str = strtok_r(NULL, delimiter, &tmp);
+ }
- ret = gf_asprintf (&searchstr, "auth.addr.%s.reject", name);
- if (-1 == ret) {
- gf_log ("auth/addr", GF_LOG_ERROR,
- "asprintf failed while setting search string");
- goto out;
- }
- reject_addr = dict_get (config_params, searchstr);
- GF_FREE (searchstr);
-
- if (!allow_addr) {
- /* TODO: backword compatibility */
- ret = gf_asprintf (&searchstr, "auth.ip.%s.allow", name);
- if (-1 == ret) {
- gf_log ("auth/addr", GF_LOG_ERROR,
- "asprintf failed while setting search string");
- goto out;
- }
- allow_addr = dict_get (config_params, searchstr);
- GF_FREE (searchstr);
- }
+ ret = -1;
+out:
+ return ret;
+}
- if (!(allow_addr || reject_addr)) {
- gf_log ("auth/addr", GF_LOG_DEBUG,
- "none of the options auth.addr.%s.allow or "
- "auth.addr.%s.reject specified, returning auth_dont_care",
- name, name);
- goto out;
+void
+parse_entries_and_compare(char *option_str, char *peer_addr, char *subvol,
+ char *subdir, auth_result_t *result,
+ auth_result_t status)
+{
+ char *entry = NULL;
+ char *entry_cpy = NULL;
+ char *directory = NULL;
+ char *entries = NULL;
+ char *addr_str = NULL;
+ char *addr = NULL;
+ char *tmp = NULL;
+ char *tmpdir = NULL;
+ int ret = 0;
+
+ if (!subdir) {
+ gf_log(subvol, GF_LOG_WARNING,
+ "subdir entry not present, not performing any operation.");
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ entries = gf_strdup(option_str);
+ if (!entries)
+ goto out;
+
+ if (entries[0] != '/' && !strchr(entries, '(')) {
+ /* Backward compatible option */
+ ret = compare_addr_and_update(entries, peer_addr, subvol, ",", result,
+ status);
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ entry = strtok_r(entries, ENTRY_DELIMITER, &tmp);
+ while (entry) {
+ entry_cpy = gf_strdup(entry);
+ if (!entry_cpy) {
+ goto out;
}
- peer_info_data = dict_get (input_params, "peer-info");
- if (!peer_info_data) {
- gf_log ("auth/addr", GF_LOG_ERROR,
- "peer-info not present");
- goto out;
+ directory = strtok_r(entry_cpy, "(", &tmpdir);
+ if (directory[0] != '/')
+ goto out;
+
+ /* send second portion, after ' =' if directory matches */
+ if (strcmp(subdir, directory))
+ goto next_entry;
+
+ addr_str = strtok_r(NULL, ")", &tmpdir);
+ if (!addr_str)
+ goto out;
+
+ addr = gf_strdup(addr_str);
+ if (!addr)
+ goto out;
+
+ gf_log(subvol, GF_LOG_INFO,
+ "Found an entry for dir %s (%s),"
+ " performing validation",
+ subdir, addr);
+
+ ret = compare_addr_and_update(addr, peer_addr, subvol, ADDR_DELIMITER,
+ result, status);
+ if (ret == 0) {
+ break;
}
- peer_info = data_to_ptr (peer_info_data);
+ GF_FREE(addr);
+ addr = NULL;
- switch (((struct sockaddr *) &peer_info->sockaddr)->sa_family)
- {
- case AF_INET_SDP:
- is_inet_sdp = 1;
- ((struct sockaddr *) &peer_info->sockaddr)->sa_family = AF_INET;
+ next_entry:
+ entry = strtok_r(NULL, ENTRY_DELIMITER, &tmp);
+ GF_FREE(entry_cpy);
+ entry_cpy = NULL;
+ }
+
+out:
+ GF_FREE(entries);
+ GF_FREE(entry_cpy);
+ GF_FREE(addr);
+}
+auth_result_t
+gf_auth(dict_t *input_params, dict_t *config_params)
+{
+ auth_result_t result = AUTH_DONT_CARE;
+ int ret = 0;
+ char *name = NULL;
+ char *searchstr = NULL;
+ peer_info_t *peer_info = NULL;
+ data_t *peer_info_data = NULL;
+ data_t *allow_addr = NULL;
+ data_t *reject_addr = NULL;
+ char *service = NULL;
+ uint16_t peer_port = 0;
+ char peer_addr[UNIX_PATH_MAX] = {
+ 0,
+ };
+ char *type = NULL;
+ gf_boolean_t allow_insecure = _gf_false;
+ char *subdir = NULL;
+
+ name = data_to_str(dict_get(input_params, "remote-subvolume"));
+ if (!name) {
+ gf_log("authenticate/addr", GF_LOG_DEBUG,
+ "remote-subvolume not specified");
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ ret = gf_asprintf(&searchstr, "auth.addr.%s.allow", name);
+ if (-1 == ret) {
+ gf_log("auth/addr", GF_LOG_DEBUG,
+ "asprintf failed while setting search string");
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ allow_addr = dict_get(config_params, searchstr);
+ GF_FREE(searchstr);
+
+ ret = gf_asprintf(&searchstr, "auth.addr.%s.reject", name);
+ if (-1 == ret) {
+ gf_log("auth/addr", GF_LOG_ERROR,
+ "asprintf failed while setting search string");
+ goto out;
+ }
+ reject_addr = dict_get(config_params, searchstr);
+ GF_FREE(searchstr);
+
+ if (!allow_addr) {
+ /* TODO: backward compatibility */
+ ret = gf_asprintf(&searchstr, "auth.ip.%s.allow", name);
+ if (-1 == ret) {
+ gf_log("auth/addr", GF_LOG_ERROR,
+ "asprintf failed while setting search string");
+ goto out;
+ }
+ allow_addr = dict_get(config_params, searchstr);
+ GF_FREE(searchstr);
+ }
+
+ if (!(allow_addr || reject_addr)) {
+ gf_log("auth/addr", GF_LOG_DEBUG,
+ "none of the options auth.addr.%s.allow or "
+ "auth.addr.%s.reject specified, returning auth_dont_care",
+ name, name);
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ peer_info_data = dict_get(input_params, "peer-info");
+ if (!peer_info_data) {
+ gf_log("auth/addr", GF_LOG_ERROR, "peer-info not present");
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ ret = dict_get_str(input_params, "subdir-mount", &subdir);
+ if (ret) {
+ subdir = "/";
+ }
+
+ peer_info = data_to_ptr(peer_info_data);
+
+ switch (((struct sockaddr *)&peer_info->sockaddr)->sa_family) {
+ case AF_INET_SDP:
case AF_INET:
case AF_INET6:
- {
- strcpy (peer_addr, peer_info->identifier);
- service = strrchr (peer_addr, ':');
- *service = '\0';
- service ++;
-
- if (is_inet_sdp) {
- ((struct sockaddr *) &peer_info->sockaddr)->sa_family = AF_INET_SDP;
- }
-
- ret = dict_get_str (config_params, "rpc-auth-allow-insecure",
- &type);
- if (ret == 0) {
- ret = gf_string2boolean (type, &allow_insecure);
- if (ret < 0) {
- gf_log ("auth/addr", GF_LOG_WARNING,
- "rpc-auth-allow-insecure option %s "
- "is not a valid bool option", type);
- goto out;
- }
- }
-
- peer_port = atoi (service);
- if (peer_port >= PRIVILEGED_PORT_CEILING && !allow_insecure) {
- gf_log ("auth/addr", GF_LOG_ERROR,
- "client is bound to port %d which is not privileged",
- peer_port);
- goto out;
+ strcpy(peer_addr, peer_info->identifier);
+ service = strrchr(peer_addr, ':');
+ *service = '\0';
+ service++;
+
+ ret = dict_get_str(config_params, "rpc-auth-allow-insecure", &type);
+ if (ret == 0) {
+ ret = gf_string2boolean(type, &allow_insecure);
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ gf_log("auth/addr", GF_LOG_WARNING,
+ "rpc-auth-allow-insecure option %s "
+ "is not a valid bool option",
+ type);
+ goto out;
}
- break;
+ }
+
+ peer_port = atoi(service);
+ if (peer_port >= PRIVILEGED_PORT_CEILING && !allow_insecure) {
+ gf_log("auth/addr", GF_LOG_ERROR,
+ "client is bound to port %d which is not privileged",
+ peer_port);
+ result = AUTH_REJECT;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ break;
case AF_UNIX:
- strcpy (peer_addr, peer_info->identifier);
- break;
+ strcpy(peer_addr, peer_info->identifier);
+ break;
default:
- gf_log ("authenticate/addr", GF_LOG_ERROR,
- "unknown address family %d",
- ((struct sockaddr *) &peer_info->sockaddr)->sa_family);
- goto out;
- }
- }
-
- if (reject_addr) {
- addr_cpy = gf_strdup (reject_addr->data);
- if (!addr_cpy)
- goto out;
-
- addr_str = strtok_r (addr_cpy, ADDR_DELIMITER, &tmp);
-
- while (addr_str) {
- gf_log (name, GF_LOG_DEBUG,
- "rejected = \"%s\", received addr = \"%s\"",
- addr_str, peer_addr);
- if (addr_str[0] == '!') {
- negate = 1;
- addr_str++;
- }
-
- match = fnmatch (addr_str, peer_addr, 0);
- if (negate ? match : !match) {
- result = AUTH_REJECT;
- goto out;
- }
- addr_str = strtok_r (NULL, ADDR_DELIMITER, &tmp);
- }
- GF_FREE (addr_cpy);
- addr_cpy = NULL;
- }
-
- if (allow_addr) {
- addr_cpy = gf_strdup (allow_addr->data);
- if (!addr_cpy)
- goto out;
-
- addr_str = strtok_r (addr_cpy, ADDR_DELIMITER, &tmp);
-
- while (addr_str) {
- gf_log (name, GF_LOG_DEBUG,
- "allowed = \"%s\", received addr = \"%s\"",
- addr_str, peer_addr);
- if (addr_str[0] == '!') {
- negate = 1;
- addr_str++;
- }
-
- match = fnmatch (addr_str, peer_addr, 0);
- if (negate ? match : !match) {
- result = AUTH_ACCEPT;
- goto out;
- }
- addr_str = strtok_r (NULL, ADDR_DELIMITER, &tmp);
- }
- }
+ gf_log("authenticate/addr", GF_LOG_ERROR,
+ "unknown address family %d",
+ ((struct sockaddr *)&peer_info->sockaddr)->sa_family);
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if (reject_addr) {
+ parse_entries_and_compare(reject_addr->data, peer_addr, name, subdir,
+ &result, AUTH_REJECT);
+ if (result == AUTH_REJECT)
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if (allow_addr) {
+ parse_entries_and_compare(allow_addr->data, peer_addr, name, subdir,
+ &result, AUTH_ACCEPT);
+ }
out:
- GF_FREE (addr_cpy);
-
- return result;
+ return result;
}
struct volume_options options[] = {
- { .key = {"auth.addr.*.allow"},
- .type = GF_OPTION_TYPE_INTERNET_ADDRESS_LIST
- },
- { .key = {"auth.addr.*.reject"},
- .type = GF_OPTION_TYPE_INTERNET_ADDRESS_LIST
- },
- /* Backword compatibility */
- { .key = {"auth.ip.*.allow"},
- .type = GF_OPTION_TYPE_INTERNET_ADDRESS_LIST
- },
- { .key = {NULL} }
-};
+ {
+ .key = {"auth.addr.*.allow"},
+ .type = GF_OPTION_TYPE_INTERNET_ADDRESS_LIST,
+ .default_value = "*",
+ .description = "List of addresses to be allowed to access volume",
+ .op_version = {1},
+ .flags = OPT_FLAG_SETTABLE | OPT_FLAG_DOC,
+ .tags = {},
+ /* option_validation_fn validate_fn; */
+ },
+ {
+ .key = {"auth.addr.*.reject"},
+ .type = GF_OPTION_TYPE_INTERNET_ADDRESS_LIST,
+ .default_value = "*",
+ .description = "List of addresses to be rejected to access volume",
+ .op_version = {1},
+ .flags = OPT_FLAG_SETTABLE | OPT_FLAG_DOC,
+ .tags = {},
+ /* option_validation_fn validate_fn; */
+ },
+ /* Backward compatibility */
+ {
+ .key = {"auth.ip.*.allow"},
+ .type = GF_OPTION_TYPE_INTERNET_ADDRESS_LIST,
+ .default_value = "*",
+ .description = "List of addresses to be allowed to access volume",
+ .op_version = {1},
+ .flags = OPT_FLAG_SETTABLE | OPT_FLAG_DOC,
+ .tags = {},
+ /* option_validation_fn validate_fn; */
+ },
+ {.key = {NULL}}};
diff --git a/xlators/protocol/auth/login/src/Makefile.am b/xlators/protocol/auth/login/src/Makefile.am
index d84db91c4e1..9837437b11e 100644
--- a/xlators/protocol/auth/login/src/Makefile.am
+++ b/xlators/protocol/auth/login/src/Makefile.am
@@ -1,12 +1,13 @@
auth_LTLIBRARIES = login.la
authdir = $(libdir)/glusterfs/$(PACKAGE_VERSION)/auth
-login_la_LDFLAGS = -module -avoid-version
+login_la_LDFLAGS = -module $(GF_XLATOR_LDFLAGS)
login_la_SOURCES = login.c
login_la_LIBADD = $(top_builddir)/libglusterfs/src/libglusterfs.la
AM_CPPFLAGS = $(GF_CPPFLAGS) -I$(top_srcdir)/libglusterfs/src \
- -I$(top_srcdir)/xlators/protocol/server/src
+ -I$(top_srcdir)/xlators/protocol/server/src \
+ -I$(top_srcdir)/rpc/xdr/src -I$(top_builddir)/rpc/xdr/src
AM_CFLAGS = -Wall $(GF_CFLAGS)
diff --git a/xlators/protocol/auth/login/src/login.c b/xlators/protocol/auth/login/src/login.c
index e799dd22c1f..64521267bfe 100644
--- a/xlators/protocol/auth/login/src/login.c
+++ b/xlators/protocol/auth/login/src/login.c
@@ -11,154 +11,200 @@
#include <fnmatch.h>
#include "authenticate.h"
-auth_result_t gf_auth (dict_t *input_params, dict_t *config_params)
+/* Note on strict_auth
+ * - Strict auth kicks in when authentication is using the username, password
+ * in the volfile to login
+ * - If enabled, auth is rejected if the username and password is not matched
+ * or is not present
+ * - When using SSL names, this is automatically strict, and allows only those
+ * names that are present in the allow list, IOW strict auth checking has no
+ * implication when using SSL names
+ */
+
+auth_result_t
+gf_auth(dict_t *input_params, dict_t *config_params)
{
- auth_result_t result = AUTH_DONT_CARE;
- int ret = 0;
- data_t *allow_user = NULL;
- data_t *username_data = NULL;
- data_t *passwd_data = NULL;
- data_t *password_data = NULL;
- char *username = NULL;
- char *password = NULL;
- char *brick_name = NULL;
- char *searchstr = NULL;
- char *username_str = NULL;
- char *tmp = NULL;
- char *username_cpy = NULL;
- gf_boolean_t using_ssl = _gf_false;
-
- username_data = dict_get (input_params, "ssl-name");
- if (username_data) {
- gf_log ("auth/login", GF_LOG_INFO,
- "connecting user name: %s", username_data->data);
- using_ssl = _gf_true;
- }
- else {
- username_data = dict_get (input_params, "username");
- if (!username_data) {
- gf_log ("auth/login", GF_LOG_DEBUG,
- "username not found, returning DONT-CARE");
- goto out;
- }
- password_data = dict_get (input_params, "password");
- if (!password_data) {
- gf_log ("auth/login", GF_LOG_WARNING,
- "password not found, returning DONT-CARE");
- goto out;
- }
- password = data_to_str (password_data);
+ auth_result_t result = AUTH_DONT_CARE;
+ int ret = 0;
+ data_t *allow_user = NULL;
+ data_t *username_data = NULL;
+ data_t *passwd_data = NULL;
+ data_t *password_data = NULL;
+ char *username = NULL;
+ char *password = NULL;
+ char *brick_name = NULL;
+ char *searchstr = NULL;
+ char *username_str = NULL;
+ char *tmp = NULL;
+ char *username_cpy = NULL;
+ gf_boolean_t using_ssl = _gf_false;
+ gf_boolean_t strict_auth = _gf_false;
+
+ username_data = dict_get(input_params, "ssl-name");
+ if (username_data) {
+ gf_log("auth/login", GF_LOG_INFO, "connecting user name: %s",
+ username_data->data);
+ using_ssl = _gf_true;
+ } else {
+ ret = dict_get_str_boolean(config_params, "strict-auth-accept",
+ _gf_false);
+ if (ret == -1)
+ strict_auth = _gf_false;
+ else
+ strict_auth = ret;
+
+ username_data = dict_get(input_params, "username");
+ if (!username_data) {
+ if (strict_auth) {
+ gf_log("auth/login", GF_LOG_DEBUG,
+ "username not found, strict auth"
+ " configured returning REJECT");
+ result = AUTH_REJECT;
+ } else {
+ gf_log("auth/login", GF_LOG_DEBUG,
+ "username not found, returning"
+ " DONT-CARE");
+ }
+ goto out;
}
- username = data_to_str (username_data);
-
- brick_name = data_to_str (dict_get (input_params, "remote-subvolume"));
- if (!brick_name) {
- gf_log ("auth/login", GF_LOG_ERROR,
- "remote-subvolume not specified");
+ password_data = dict_get(input_params, "password");
+ if (!password_data) {
+ if (strict_auth) {
+ gf_log("auth/login", GF_LOG_DEBUG,
+ "password not found, strict auth"
+ " configured returning REJECT");
result = AUTH_REJECT;
- goto out;
+ } else {
+ gf_log("auth/login", GF_LOG_WARNING,
+ "password not found, returning"
+ " DONT-CARE");
+ }
+ goto out;
}
-
- ret = gf_asprintf (&searchstr, "auth.login.%s.%s", brick_name,
- using_ssl ? "ssl-allow" : "allow");
- if (-1 == ret) {
- gf_log ("auth/login", GF_LOG_WARNING,
- "asprintf failed while setting search string, "
- "returning DONT-CARE");
- goto out;
+ password = data_to_str(password_data);
+ }
+ username = data_to_str(username_data);
+
+ brick_name = data_to_str(dict_get(input_params, "remote-subvolume"));
+ if (!brick_name) {
+ gf_log("auth/login", GF_LOG_ERROR, "remote-subvolume not specified");
+ result = AUTH_REJECT;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ ret = gf_asprintf(&searchstr, "auth.login.%s.%s", brick_name,
+ using_ssl ? "ssl-allow" : "allow");
+ if (-1 == ret) {
+ gf_log("auth/login", GF_LOG_ERROR,
+ "asprintf failed while setting search string, "
+ "returning REJECT");
+ result = AUTH_REJECT;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ allow_user = dict_get(config_params, searchstr);
+ GF_FREE(searchstr);
+
+ if (allow_user) {
+ gf_log("auth/login", GF_LOG_INFO, "allowed user names: %s",
+ allow_user->data);
+ /*
+ * There's a subtle difference between SSL and non-SSL behavior
+ * if we can't match anything in the "while" loop below.
+ * Intuitively, we should AUTH_REJECT if there's no match.
+ * However, existing code depends on allowing untrusted users
+ * to connect with *no credentials at all* by falling through
+ * the loop. They're still distinguished from trusted users
+ * who do provide a valid username and password (in fact that's
+ * pretty much the only thing we use non-SSL login auth for),
+ * but they are allowed to connect. It's wrong, but it's not
+ * worth changing elsewhere. Therefore, we do the sane thing
+ * only for SSL here.
+ *
+ * For SSL, if there's a list *you must be on it*. Note that
+ * if there's no list we don't care. In that case (and the
+ * ssl-allow=* case as well) authorization is effectively
+ * disabled, though authentication and encryption are still
+ * active.
+ *
+ * Read NOTE on strict_auth above.
+ */
+ if (using_ssl || strict_auth) {
+ result = AUTH_REJECT;
}
-
- allow_user = dict_get (config_params, searchstr);
- GF_FREE (searchstr);
-
- if (allow_user) {
- gf_log ("auth/login", GF_LOG_INFO,
- "allowed user names: %s", allow_user->data);
- /*
- * There's a subtle difference between SSL and non-SSL behavior
- * if we can't match anything in the "while" loop below.
- * Intuitively, we should AUTH_REJECT if there's no match.
- * However, existing code depends on allowing untrusted users
- * to connect with *no credentials at all* by falling through
- * the loop. They're still distinguished from trusted users
- * who do provide a valid username and password (in fact that's
- * pretty much the only thing we use non-SSL login auth for),
- * but they are allowed to connect. It's wrong, but it's not
- * worth changing elsewhere. Therefore, we do the sane thing
- * only for SSL here.
- *
- * For SSL, if there's a list *you must be on it*. Note that
- * if there's no list we don't care. In that case (and the
- * ssl-allow=* case as well) authorization is effectively
- * disabled, though authentication and encryption are still
- * active.
- */
+ username_cpy = gf_strdup(allow_user->data);
+ if (!username_cpy)
+ goto out;
+
+ username_str = strtok_r(username_cpy, " ,", &tmp);
+
+ /*
+ * We have to match a user's *authenticated* name to one in the
+ * list. If we're using SSL, they're already authenticated.
+ * Otherwise, they need a matching password to complete the
+ * process.
+ */
+ while (username_str) {
+ if (!fnmatch(username_str, username, 0)) {
if (using_ssl) {
- result = AUTH_REJECT;
+ result = AUTH_ACCEPT;
+ break;
+ }
+ ret = gf_asprintf(&searchstr, "auth.login.%s.password",
+ username);
+ if (-1 == ret) {
+ gf_log("auth/login", GF_LOG_WARNING,
+ "asprintf failed while setting search string");
+ goto out;
}
- username_cpy = gf_strdup (allow_user->data);
- if (!username_cpy)
- goto out;
-
- username_str = strtok_r (username_cpy, " ,", &tmp);
-
- /*
- * We have to match a user's *authenticated* name to one in the
- * list. If we're using SSL, they're already authenticated.
- * Otherwise, they need a matching password to complete the
- * process.
- */
- while (username_str) {
- if (!fnmatch (username_str, username, 0)) {
- if (using_ssl) {
- result = AUTH_ACCEPT;
- break;
- }
- ret = gf_asprintf (&searchstr,
- "auth.login.%s.password",
- username);
- if (-1 == ret) {
- gf_log ("auth/login", GF_LOG_WARNING,
- "asprintf failed while setting search string");
- goto out;
- }
- passwd_data = dict_get (config_params, searchstr);
- GF_FREE (searchstr);
-
- if (!passwd_data) {
- gf_log ("auth/login", GF_LOG_ERROR,
- "wrong username/password combination");
- result = AUTH_REJECT;
- goto out;
- }
-
- result = !((strcmp (data_to_str (passwd_data),
- password)) ?
- AUTH_ACCEPT :
- AUTH_REJECT);
- if (result == AUTH_REJECT)
- gf_log ("auth/login", GF_LOG_ERROR,
- "wrong password for user %s",
- username);
-
- break;
- }
- username_str = strtok_r (NULL, " ,", &tmp);
+ passwd_data = dict_get(config_params, searchstr);
+ GF_FREE(searchstr);
+
+ if (!passwd_data) {
+ gf_log("auth/login", GF_LOG_ERROR,
+ "wrong username/password combination");
+ result = AUTH_REJECT;
+ goto out;
}
+
+ result = !((strcmp(data_to_str(passwd_data), password))
+ ? AUTH_ACCEPT
+ : AUTH_REJECT);
+ if (result == AUTH_REJECT)
+ gf_log("auth/login", GF_LOG_ERROR,
+ "wrong password for user %s", username);
+
+ break;
+ }
+ username_str = strtok_r(NULL, " ,", &tmp);
}
+ }
out:
- GF_FREE (username_cpy);
+ GF_FREE(username_cpy);
- return result;
+ return result;
}
struct volume_options options[] = {
- { .key = {"auth.login.*.allow"},
- .type = GF_OPTION_TYPE_ANY
- },
- { .key = {"auth.login.*.password"},
- .type = GF_OPTION_TYPE_ANY
- },
- { .key = {NULL} }
-};
+ {
+ .key = {"auth.login.*.allow"},
+ .type = GF_OPTION_TYPE_ANY,
+ .default_value = "*",
+ .description = "Username to be allowed access to the volume",
+ .op_version = {1},
+ .flags = OPT_FLAG_SETTABLE | OPT_FLAG_DOC,
+ .tags = {},
+ /* option_validation_fn validate_fn; */
+ },
+ {
+ .key = {"auth.login.*.password"},
+ .type = GF_OPTION_TYPE_ANY,
+ .default_value = "*",
+ .description = "Password for the allowed username",
+ .op_version = {1},
+ .flags = OPT_FLAG_SETTABLE | OPT_FLAG_DOC,
+ .tags = {},
+ /* option_validation_fn validate_fn; */
+ },
+ {.key = {NULL}}};
generated by cgit (git 2.34.1) at 2025-12-28 22:41:15 +0000